Es handelt sich um eine sozialpsychologische Untersuchung, die unter der Leitung von Franz Boas, dem Vorstand des Department of Anthropology an der Columbia University, New York, unternommen worden ist.Die Hauptmerkmale des Gebärdenspiels zweier verschiedener sogenannter rassischer Gruppen (Italiener und Juden) sind unter verschiedenen und ähnlichen Umgebungsbedingungen mit Hilfe von Filmaufnahmen untersucht worden. Das Ziel der Untersuchung war, festzustellen :a) ob es hinsichtlich des Gebärdenspiels irgendwelche durchgängigen Gruppenunterschiede zwischen noch nicht amerikanisierten jüdischen und italienischen Schichten gibt, und, falls ja,b) welches Schicksal (...) solche Merkmale unter dem Einfluss der sozialen Anpassung erfahren. — Die Ergebnisse geben auf die erste Frage eine bejahende Antwort : Das Gebärdenspiel beim Gespräch der nicht-assimilierten Italiener und Juden ist recht verschieden, und zwar sowohl hinsichtlich der räumlichen und zeitlichen als auch der sprachtechnischen Gestaltung ihrer Gebärden. Für die zweite Frage zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Unterschiede, die bei den noch traditionell gebundenen Gruppen angetroffen wurden, bei ihren amerikanisierten Nachkommen zu verschwinden trachten, deren Gesten untereinander und den angelsächsischen Gruppen angenähert werden. Ferner hat sich herausgestellt, dass der Prozess der Angleichung des Gebärdenspiels entsprechend der sozialen Situation verläuft, in welcher sich der Nachkomme der noch nicht assimilierten Familie befindet.L'article traite d’une enquête de psychologie sociale, entreprise sous la direction de M. Franz Boas, président du Department of Anthropology à l’université de Columbia, New York.Les caractères propres à la mimique de deux groupes, considérés vulgairement comme racialement différents, juifs et italiens, ont été étudiés par le procédé de prises de vue cinématographiques, dans des milieux tantôt semblables, tantôt différents. Le but de l’enquête était : *1° d’établir s’il existait, dans la mimique, des différences spécifiques entre italiens et juifs non encore américanisés ; et, dans le cas d’une réponse affirmative :2° d’étudier ce que devenaient ces différences sous l’action de l’adaptation sociale. Les résultats donnent à la première question une réponse affirmative : la mimique des juifs et des italiens non encore américanisés, dans la conversation, est très différente — différences qui s’expriment aussi bien dans la figuration spaciale et temporelle des gestes que dans la technique du langage. Pour la deuxième question, les résultats montrent que les différences observées sur des groupes cohérents, encore soumis à la tradition, tendent à disparaître dans les générations américanisées ; les gestes s’uniformisent et se rapprochent de ceux des anglo-saxons. D’autre part, il s’est révélé que l’adaptation de la mimique se déroule d’une manière qui varie avec la situation sociale dans laquelle se trouve le descendant d’une famille non encore américanisée. (shrink)

In “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” Richard Foley reflects on such central topics in epistemology as knowledge, warrant, rationality, and justification, with the purpose of distinguishing such concepts in a general theory. Foley uses “warrant” to refer to that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief and suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. He proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction between “rationality” and “rationality all things (...) considered.” Foley proposes how these concepts can work together in a system that “provides the necessary materials for an approach to epistemology that is clarifying, theoretically respectable, and relevant to our actual lives.”. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness are based on widely different concepts of its nature, most or all of which probably embody aspects of the truth about it. Starting with a concept of consciousness indicated by the phrase “the feeling of what happens” (the title of a book by Antonio Damásio), we attempt to build a framework capable of supporting and resolving divergent views. We picture consciousness in terms of Reality experiencing itself from the perspective of cognitive agents. Each conscious experience is (...) regarded as composed of momentary feeling events that are combined by recognition and evaluation into extended conscious episodes that bind cognitive contents with a wide range of apparent durations (0.1 secs to 2 or more secs, for us humans, depending on circumstances and context). Three necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness are identified: a) a ground of Reality, envisaged as an universal field of potentiality encompassing all possible manifestations, whether material or 'mental'; b) a transitional zone, leading to; c) a manifest world with its fundamental divisions into material, 'informational' and quale-endowed aspects. We explore ideas about the nature of these necessary conditions, how they may relate to one another and whether our suggestions have empirical implications. (shrink)

I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...) consequentialism is true. This kind of applied moral skepticism introduces problematic limits on our ability to use objective act consequentialism’s explanatory power as evidence for its truth. This is, in part, a product of higher-order defeat as I explain in the final section. There is, however, a silver lining for objective act consequentialists. For there is at least one type of objective act consequentialism, prior existence consequentialism, that is poised to avoid at least some of the epistemic problems discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Charles Griswold has written a comprehensive philosophical study of Smith's moral and political thought. Griswold sets Smith's work in the context of the Enlightenment and relates it to current discussions in moral and political philosophy. Smith's appropriation as well as criticism of ancient philosophy, and his carefully balanced defence of a liberal and humane moral and political outlook, are also explored. This 1999 book is a major philosophical and historical reassessment of a key figure in the Enlightenment that will be (...) of particular interest to philosophers and political and legal theorists, as well as historians of ideas, rhetoric, and political economy. (shrink)

In earlier work, the author has studied the economic role of planning horizons in making a case for complementarity as the predominant feature of social interdependence. This paper compares the different choice strategies implied by substitution, opposition and conflicts of interest in an economics of fear with those arising from horizon effects, economic complementarity and concerts of interest in an economics based on love. The contrasting implications of a psychological literature on negative vs. positive emotions and their health effects, along (...) with the findings in neurophysiological research about how humans are hard-wired for empathy and compassion leads to some fundamental changes in how we might address and revise social problems through economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to extend a horizonal case for complementarity in the author's previous work into its psychological links to research findings on healthy cognitive function and its emotional basis. An economics of substitution yields quite different conclusions about optimal institutional forms and how we address and frame social relations than are implied by an explicitly horizonal economics of complementary social relations. Recent psychological and neurophysiological studies support a horizonal case for complementarity in social relations, showing that our orthodox substitution assumptions and models of competitive equilibrium should be rejected for a renewed economic analysis based on horizonal models of complementarity and cooperation as a means to achieve greater social well-being in a healthier and more integrative form of social organization. The issues to be explored are not entertained within the currently existing frame of orthodox economics, so we must step beyond our standard habitual assumptions. (shrink)

Interpreting Figurative Meaning critically evaluates the recent empirical work from psycholinguistics and neuroscience examining the successes and difficulties associated with interpreting figurative language. There is now a huge, often contradictory literature on how people understand figures of speech. Gibbs and Colston argue that there may not be a single theory or model that adequately explains both the processes and products of figurative meaning experience. Experimental research may ultimately be unable to simply adjudicate between current models in psychology, linguistics and philosophy (...) of how figurative meaning is interpreted. Alternatively, the authors advance a broad theoretical framework, motivated by ideas from 'dynamical systems theory', that describes the multiple, interacting influences which shape people's experiences of figurative meaning in discourse. This book details past research and theory, offers a critical assessment of this work and sets the stage for a new vision of figurative experience in human life. (shrink)

Expressions of the form 'S is aware of the fact that p' are commonplace. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than (...) knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as ‘first’ in recent epistemology. (shrink)

_Addresses of the Mississippi Philosophical Association_ is a collection of presidential and invited addresses from the members of the Mississippi Philosophical Association (MPA). Papers date from the inception of the association in the mid-1940s and continue through 1999. The common thread in these addresses is the authors' service to or leadership in the MPA. The content and methods in the chapters are diverse, including addresses on ethics, political philosophy, history of philosophy, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, philosophy (...) of science, and philosophical theology. Some unique features of this book are a history of the MPA, biographical sketches and photographs of each contributor, and the inclusion of the unpublished 1988 Dunbar Lectures from Millsaps College and the unpublished 1992 Akin Lecture from Mississippi College. These essays and lectures reveal the vitality of philosophy in the colleges and universities of Mississippi. As part of the special series, Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies in the larger Value Inquiry Book Series, this book documents - in a unique historical format - the value and vitality of a state philosophical organization. “There has been no attempt to mold these addresses into a unity; rather, the addresses offer a glimpse of the pluralistic philosophical reflection among the philosophical faculties of the private colleges and public universities in the state of Mississippi. To the surprise of some people, philosophy is alive, well, diverse, and flourishing in Mississippi!” (from the Preface). (shrink)

When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...) independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other. (shrink)

Bowman-Smart et al. (2023) argue for a framework to examine the ethical issues associated with genetic screening for non-medical traits in the context of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT). Such s...